Robert E. Lee's Strategy, 1861-1862
The Confederacy’s Defense through Offense under General Lee
Oct 15, 2008 Nicholas Efstathiou
In the first two years of the Civil War, 1861-1862, Robert E. Lee understood that the defensive strategy desired by Jefferson Davis was impractical when pitted against the industrial capabilities of the Northern states. Lee’s realization, then, manifested itself in both his operational and strategic actions.
Robert E. Lee and the Offensive-Defensive Strategy
Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, in their work For the Common Defense, state that strategically Lee saw the impracticality of entrenching troops while seeking to defend the southern coast. Russel F. Weigley, in The American way of War, points out the fact that the rifled artillery of the Federals made short work of the Confederacy’s strongest fortifications. In addition to the power brought to the coastal attack by the rifled barrels, Lee also saw that the South could ill afford to lose the large members of Confederate troops needed to garrison the coast against Federal attack.
In order to properly utilize the Confederacy’s limited resources, both in personnel and logistics, Lee recognized that an offensive-defensive strategy needed to replace the purely defensive strategy of Davis. Only through attacking could the Confederacy hope to counter the Federals’ numbers and industrial power. Lee saw that an offensive-defensive strategy, with well-coordinated attacks by Confederate forces, Weigley states, would force the Federals to react and focus upon limited areas. This, in turn, would limit the Federals’ ability to attack the South at a variety of points simultaneously.
Lee and the Confederate Concentration of Power
Lee understood, then, that a smaller force of Confederate troops attacking a larger, divided foe, with concentrated power, could be extremely successful for the numerically weaker attacker. Once Lee reached the field of battle his understanding of the operational needs for victory against a modern industrialized opponent were brilliant.
Millett and maslowski show that Lee consistently sought to bring a concentration of troops against weaker elements of a Federal force, winning enough battles to force Federal commanders, such as General George McClellan, to seek even greater troop concentrations before an attack. Lee also showed his operational understanding of the needs of modern war via his attacks on Federal rail lines. Intelligence and coordination between units moved Lee’s troops along rapidly, allowing him to effectively use an offensive-defensive strategy that focused on the division and destruction of superior Federal forces.
In the final analysis Lee had a young, but growing understanding of the strategic and operational requirements of waging a modern war. Lee learned quickly that an agrarian based economy the size of the South’s could not effectively defend against an economic and industrial power such as the North. This understanding caused the Confederacy’s strategic shift from a defensive strategy to one based on both the offensive and the defensive. Within this strategy Lee focused upon the operational tasks of swift attacks by concentrated forces against larger, but divided forces. Rapid communications, coordinated attacks, and the destruction of rail transportation were all hallmarks of Lee’s understanding of the requirements of modern war from 1861-1862.
Sources
Millett, Allan R. and Peter Maslowski. For the Common Defense. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1994.
Weigley, Russell. The American Way of War. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977.
Robert E. Lee
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