The Battle of Dien Bien Phu

The Final Stage of Guerrilla Warfare Doctrine

Jul 24, 2008 Rupert Sutton

As an insurgency grows in size it can switch from guerrilla tactics and develop into a conventional armed force that can negate the technological advantage of it's enemy.

Despite the popular image of guerrilla warfare as being comprised of night-time raids and ambushes it can be seen that once an insurgent force reaches a certain size it can begin to operate as a conventional armed force. It can then take on a counter-insurgent enemy that may think itself impregnable.

The Battle

This was shown particularly well at Dien Bien Phu in the spring of 1954 when the Viet Minh General Vo Nguyen Giap was able to concentrate his forces including artillery and anti aircraft weapons around a well-defended French airhead. The result of this was that “from 30th March to 1st May, nearly 10,000 French soldiers lay trapped in the Dien Bien Phu valley, surrounded by 45,000 Viet Minh”[1].

The French troops were eventually forced to surrender and it could be argued that this crushing defeat did as much to dispel the myth of invincibility that surrounded Western troops as their defeats at the hands of the Japanese had done during the Second World War.

The Viet Minh Artillery

Something particularly significant about this defeat was that it was not just one of infantry beating infantry either. The Battle of Dien Bien Phu also showed the Vietnamese people that the Viet Minh were able to counter the French technological advantage. The British historian Rupert Smith tells us that “On 13th March 1954, Viet Minh artillery shattered the myth of superiority of French firepower”[2] and this ability of the Viet Minh to show that they could match the French is also shown by Bernard Fall who described the Viet Minh artillery as “invulnerable…to French counter-battery fire”[3].

The artillery amassed by Giap at Dien Bien Phu was of high quality as well as being efficiently served, with many pieces being of Chinese or Russian origin. These included 24 105mm howitzers[4], a number of heavy guns that equalled the amount that the French had. However, the Viet Minh artillery was well concealed whilst the French guns were out in the open. These artillery pieces were also supplemented by other heavy weapons; in particular, the Viet Minh’s use of 75mm recoilless rifles firing at point blank range from the hills above the French positions in the valley below was exceptionally effective.

The way in which this artillery was positioned; high up and in well-concealed jungle hides then made it highly resistant to French counter battery fire, yet able to attack the French guns almost at will. Hamilton and Kaplan say that “the fierce counter battery duels exacted a heavy toll in French lives and ammunition stocks”[5] and also that “the French gunners took severe casualties early in the battle”[6], something which shows how effective Giap and the Viet Minh’s use of artillery was and how they were able to use it to overcome France’s technological superiority.

The Result

By April 1954 the Viet Minh’s artillery superiority and control of the area surrounding Dien Bien Phu was so great that they had even been able to pull “effective anti aircraft guns out through the jungle into the surrounding hills”[7], something which made the French attempts to use their air power “progressively more difficult”[8]. The French also believed that their aircraft would be able to act as spotter planes for the artillery, yet the Viet Minh were so effective at destroying these aircraft that the French commanders in the forts at Dien Bien Phu were effectively blind to what was happening both in their counter battery operations and in the Viet Minh’s troop and artillery movement.

This shows then that the standard understanding of insurgent warfare is something that is not set in stone and this is something that is ignored by counter-insurgent commanders at their peril. Their underestimation by their enemies is something that guerrillas rely on and this was well proven by the Viet Minh’s ability to win the conventional battle at Dien Bien Phu.

[1] Rupert Smith, ‘The Utility of Force’, (Penguin 2005) pg 231

[2] Ibid.

[3] Bernard Fall, ‘Hell in a Very Small Place’, (Vintage Books 1966) pg 226

[4] John Hamilton, Larry Kaplan, ‘Le Roi de Batailles: The Decisive Role of the Artillery at Dien Bien Phu’, (Field Artillery Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2, 1983) pg 29

[5] Ibid., pg 30

[6] Ibid.

[7] John McCuen, ‘The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War’, (Faber & Faber 1966) pg 282

[8] Ibid.

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