The twelve ship Japanese fleet under Admiral Itoh Sukeyuki assisted by American naval officer Walton Grinnell was attempting to disrupt the landing of Chinese troops protected by a Chinese fleet under Admiral Ting Ju ch'ang who commanded fourteen smaller ships assisted by American naval officer Philo McGiffin. The numerical balance however was for naught due to the fact that the Japanese fleet had several advantages. The Japanese ships were heavier and had a larger number of rapid fire guns than their adversaries. It should also be noted that the Japanese fleet had more experience, having started its modernization in the 1870's, nearly a dozen years before the Chinese, and this produced something of a 'training gap'. The fact that the American Grinnell only served as an advisor to Japanese Admiral Sukeyuki while the much younger McGiffin was relied on to command a section of the Chinese fleet makes this evident. Also the Chinese ships suffered from a lack of discipline and corruption. Chinese shells were found to contain sawdust or water - their powder charge long being sold along with at least one pair of main 10-inch guns that had been sold on the black market. Wily court figures even used $50 million budgeted for naval construction to build a palace for the Dowager Empress, which did, however, including a large marble fountain in the form of a ship, to comply with the requirement that the money be spent on the navy.
The opening salvo of the Chinese fleet actually injured its own admiral on the deck of its flagship and put him out of commission for much of the fight. The two largest Chinese ships, Admiral Ting's flagship the German built Ting Yeun and McGiffen's sister ship the Chen Yuen were immediately pummeled by the combined fire of the Japanese fleet. The Chinese ships were floating tinderboxes due to poor maintenance. In interest of keeping the new ships looking as new as possible their inexperienced crews had painted and repainted their vessels until every surface became a consumable. It was a very one sided battle and was never seriously in question. For five hours the Japanese fleet sailed in circles around the two large Chinese vessels and beat them mercilessly. The smaller Chinese ships broke off into pairs and attempted to either run or fight. Those that fought were sunk by the Japanese rapid fire guns fired by well drilled crews. Finally, covering each other, the two large wounded Chinese battleships were able to break off the engagement and along with the remaining five vessels of their fleet withdrew to fight again.
The butcher’s bill explains starkly who the winner was. The Japanese sank five Chinese warships, severely damaged three more and killed an estimated 850 Chinese sailors. The Chinese sank no Japanese ships but did seriously damage four of the Japanese warships, killing some 90 Japanese sailors in the process. The Chinese fleet retired into Port Arthur (now Lüshunkou) and licked its wounds. The victorious Japanese withdrew, unable to pursue due to a lack of ammunition and fear of chasing the Chinese fleet into a possible mine or torpedo ambush laid in wait for it. However the Chinese fleet did accomplish its mission that day. The Chinese landing that they were to cover was covered and the Japanese fleet was fended off. In the end this was a hopeless victory, with China going on to be defeated in land combat at the Battle of Port Arthur. Chinese Admiral Ting committed suicide on February 12, 1895 when overall defeat for his country was evident. His advisor Philo McGiffin, burned and blinded in the battle, did the same thing in 1897 in a hospital room in New York. Japanese Admiral Count Itoh Sukeyuki and his American advisor Grinnell both died peacefully during times of peace at ages 71 and 77 respectively. None of the Japanese or Chinese ships remain afloat today. A full sized replica of Ting’s flagship, the Ting Yeun was built in 2003 and is a floating museum in Beijing, with the original records of its namesake enshrined aboard
Source The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy. By Paine, S.C.M., Cambridge University Press (2002). ISBN 0-521-81714-5
