Receiving news that Ayub Khan planned to move against British-held Kandahar, the wali of Kandahar requested that a brigade be dispatched to Girishk, on the river Helmund, to bolster his own authority in the region.
Opening Moves to Maiwand
A brigade was finally assembled and moved off on 5 July. It consisted of 2,500 men and 6 guns. The brigade was commanded by General Burrows, who had spent most of his career as a staff officer and seen very little active service. It was encumbered with a large baggage train, the officers of the native regiments were new, several of the regiments were comprised largely of recruits, and it was the height of the fierce Afghan summer.
On 11 July, at Girishk, it fought a brief action against the walis mutinous troops as they fled across the Helmund to link up with Ayub Khan. The bulk of the deserters succeeded in escaping.
The Helmund was easily fordable, offering no barrier to Ayubs army, and the brigade was far from the support of Kandahar. Burrows withdrew to Khushk-i-Nakhud, about halfway between Girishk and Kandahar. He reached it on the 17th - Ayubs forces reached Girishk on the same day.
Burrows then received orders to prevent Ayub marching to Ghazni. Uncertain of Ayubs intended line of march, he dispatched cavalry patrols to scour the surrounding areas. It dawned on Burrows that Ayub would march to Ghazni by way of Maiwand. Burrows marched for Maiwand on the 27th at 6;30am: delays in mustering the baggage train meant that the brigade did not move until 7 am. By 10 am, large numbers of Afghans were seen ahead of the trudging column: the two armies had stumbled into each other.
The Battle of Maiwand
The British took up position on a flat plain, with a ravine on their right flank, running north-easterly, from which a sub-ravine ran northwest toward the Afghan army. The baggage was stationed to the south, at the village of Mandabad.
The paucity of numbers meant that the brigade had no reserve: the cavalry were dispersed in pockets behind the firing line. Excluding the baggage guard, the total number of men in the firing line did not exceed 1,900. Against them, 10 - 15,000 Afghans, with 34 guns, commenced their attack.
The battle opened with an artillery contest in which the British were totally outclassed. The raw Native regiments were particularly badly shaken by this pounding. Afghans began to trickle down the ravine on the right flank of Burrows position, and engaged the baggage guard.
Ayub hauled 2 guns down the subsidiary ravine and hammered the British centre. At 2.30 pm, a ghazi charge smashed into Burrow's centre and left flank. The natives on the left crumpled, whilst the grenadiers in the centre made a failed attempt to form square.
In at attempt to salvage the situation, Burrows ordered a cavalry charge: but the cavalry, already shaken by the casualties they had sustained, failed to push the charge home. After pausing to hack down a knot of ghazis inside the shattered remnants of the grenadier square, they retired without orders. They could not be induced to charge again, but instead fell back to cover the retreat of the brigades artillery.
The rout began. The 66th, which had formed Burrows right flank and was by far the steadiest of his troops, halted and made a stand at the village of Khig, across the ravine to the north of Mandabad. One hundred men of the 66th were cut off and made a final heroic fight (accompanied by the regimental mascot, a dog named Bobbie). Bobbie, although wounded, managed to escape and rejoined the survivors of the brigade the following day.
By 3pm, the army was in headlong flight toward Kandahar. The cavalry did little to cover the retreat and suffered only slight casualties. British losses amounted to 21 officers and 948 men killed. Ayub, who failed to press home the pursuit with any real vigour (if he had, it is unlikely that any of the brigade would have made it back to safety), lost 3,000 men.
Sources:
The Road to Kabul The Second Afghan War 1878 - 1881 Brian Robson Spellmount Edition, 2007
Britishbattles.com
