  |
|
|
|
The German Way of WarReview of the Book by Robert Citino covering Prussia to World War 2What is so uniquely effective about the German Way of War? Can today's American army successfully model itself after the German (Prussian) army?
Professor Citino explores these questions in an engaginig history (subtitled "From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich") covering three hundred years of German military history. Short and Lively WarsCitino argues that Prussia developed a uniquely effective way of war out of necessity, to protect itself from its larger neighbors. Because of its small size, decisive battlefield victories were required. It could not afford wars of attrition. Prussia therefore sought to fight short and lively (in German - "Kurtz und Vives") wars, overwhelming opponents with speed and aggression. This enabled them to win lopsided victories instead of the near-draws that characterized the battles of other nations. Mobile WarfareThe Prussian way was to win through a series of successive battles, attacking the enemy from unexpected directions and times. Mobile warfare is the essence of the German Way of War. This war of movement ("Bewegungskrieg") naturally involves the operational level of warfare. Between the tactics of the battlefield and the strategy of planning an entire war, the operational level is the middle level of how to fight one battle followed by the next. The Real Origin of the BlitzkriegAfter World War 1, the British and the French wondered how to best make use of the new weapon called the tank. In contrast, the German Army wanted to continue to their long tradition of short and lively wars, and saw the tank as a tool to achieve this. They did not create Blitzkrieg ("Lightning War") to make use of the tank, as is commonly supposed. Blitzkrieg was just Bewegungskrieg, their centuries-old default mode of fighting. World War 1 trench warfare was seen as an aberration, and a confirmation of the superiority of mobile warfare. Following Bewegungskrieg, they designed their panzer divisions as flexible self-contained combined arms units (armor, infantry, artillery, reconnaissance) optimized for mobile operations. This was the true German innovation in armored warfare, not the concentration of tanks in panzer divisions (versus distributing them to support infantry). Independent ActionWhile other historians have expressed surprise at how German commanders have disregarded orders from headquarters, Citino sees this as part of their military culture, a natural outcome of Bewegungskrieg. Bewegungskrieg implies attacking the enemy whenever and wherever possible. A German commander who took independent action and disregarded orders by attacking, was rarely disciplined afterwards. The End of Independent ActionThe effectiveness of independent action came into doubt during World War 2. The reasons were:
In 1942 German Army Chief of Staff General Franz Halder therefore issued orders to end the German tradition of encouraging independent action. The German-American Way of WarToday's US Army uses the German Army concept of mission orders ("Auftragstaktik") as the centerpiece of their interpretation of the German Way of War. The supreme commander lays out the objectives of the mission, but leaves the implementation details to his subordinate commanders. There is no provision for independent action by subordinate commanders. Strangely, Citino points out the drawbacks of independent action and the eventual German abandonment of it. Yet he chastises the US Army for misunderstanding classic Bewegungstaktik and not allowing independent action. Perhaps the US Army is correctly interpreting the spirit of the German Way of War, after all. ResourcesThe German Way of War (ISBN 0-7006-1410-9) at amazon.com
The copyright of the article The German Way of War in Military History is owned by Yuen Kit Mun. Permission to republish The German Way of War in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.
|
|
|
|
