In his 1956 article, "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660," British historian Michael Roberts argued that the changes wrought between 1560 and 1660 in the methods and scale of warfare were so monumental that they constituted a major, and lasting, military permutation. Indeed, as Roberts has it, what happened in this century was nothing less than a military revolution, with numerous political, social, and economic consequences.
This article will first describe Roberts’s thesis as it stood in 1956, then revisit and revise it, incorporating the approaches and concerns of historians of the last fifty years. Because there has been so much debate around this idea, with some historians calling into question whether there even was a military revolution, this essay will attempt to acknowledge both sides of the debate, in order to provide a fair and thorough context.
The Major Developments of the Military Revolution
One of the most important developments in Roberts’ thesis was the adoption of linear formations, first by Maurice of Orange (1567-1625) and then by Gustav Adolf (1594-1632). Not only did these smaller unit formations, based on Roman formations and only three or four ranks deep (in sharp contrast to the massive Spanish tercios and Swiss columns that had previously been in style), allow for greater maneuverability and fighting power, but their adoption affected many aspects of military organization and administration.
In addition to these changes in formation, armies in Roberts’s century began to replace the pike and the lance with small arms and artillery, a move which perhaps created the need for linear formations in the first place.
Because taking advantage of these smaller formations, now armed with more complicated weapons, required a greater degree of training, drill, and discipline, the officer corps of European armies grew dramatically in size during this time. One social consequence of this need for officers was that the army became, for many Europeans, a social elevator.
With the increase in the size of the officer corps, the armies themselves were also growing in size. Roberts points out that while Spain’s army under Philip II (1527-1598) might have numbered around 40,000 soldiers, at most, France less than a century later under Louis XIV (1638-1715) controlled an army 400,000 strong (Roberts, 203). This increase in size made armies, always expensive to begin with, now far too costly for individual nobles, thus leading to increased administrative centralization and a greater degree of military control by the state.
Even with centralized control, though, war and armies remained exorbitantly priced, and one of the ways in which states dealt with this financial cost, according to Roberts, was to rely on mercenary armies. Furthermore, because hiring mercenary armies at the start of a campaigning season and then releasing them during the winter only to rehire them again the next year was economically wasteful, states began keeping their mercenaries in work all year round, leading to the first standing armies. This 1560-1660 revolution, Roberts concludes, was the birthing place of modern warfare, laying open an ominous road, "broad and straight, to the abyss of the twentieth century" (Roberts, 218)
Reactions and Changes to the Central Thesis
Michael Roberts’s above argument is persuasive, eloquent, and influential. Geoffrey Parker, in "The ‘Military Revolution,’ 1955-2005: From Belfast to Barcelona and the Hague," celebrates Roberts and his thesis, pointing out its continued importance today (despite his having been one of the earliest authors to have challenged it, with his 1976 article, "The ‘Military Revolution,’ 1560-1660—a Myth?").
Even so, it remains an imperfect idea, and more than fifty years of historical debate have not left it unaltered. Indeed, Parker himself, after accepting the idea, tried expanding both the meaning of the term and the chronology in which it is set. His 1988 book, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, tried to place the concept of the military revolution in a global rather than European context, to explain Europe’s hegemony over much of the rest of the world during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Mahinder S. Kingra, in "The Trace Italienne and the Military Revolution During the Eighty Years’ War, 1567-1648," strongly criticized Parker for taking the concept out of its original context like this, however, claiming that Parker perverts and misuses it in his book, and, moreover, fails to even adequately argue his thesis.
Michael Roberts’s article on the military revolution has proven influential. It sparked a fifty-year debate, a debate that shows no signs of letting up in the near future. And it gave historians a new way of looking at sixteenth-and-seventeenth-century warfare. Nevertheless, it remains imperfect, even today: even after dozens of historians have tried their hands at improving it.
Focusing on what the revolution, if indeed we want to call it that, did regarding modern state construction perhaps makes setting the dates a little easier. Answering the question of why armies grew so vast in the seventeenth century also seems important. The need to explore the role religion played in the military changes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries seems obvious, as well. In addition, expanding the thesis to account for naval developments, other land war developments, and fortifications will help either to strengthen the thesis or to overturn it. In the end, the concept will continue to evolve until it is disregarded, if ever it is.
Sources
Kingra, Mahinder S. "The Trace Italienne and the Military Revolution During the Eighty Years’ War, 1567-1648." The Journal of Military History, 57, 3 (1993): 431-446.
Parker, Geoffrey. "The ‘Military Revolution,’ 1955-2005: From Belfast to Barcelona and the Hague." The Journal of Military History, 69, 1 (2005): 205-209.
Parker, Geoffrey. The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Roberts, Michael. "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660." Essays on Swedish History. London: Widenfeld and Nicolson, 1967.
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